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1、ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook2021: Post-Covid-19 Challenges andStrategic Opportunitiesby Michal TanchumABSTRACTThe European Union stands at a critical junction in the international scramble to establish EuropeAfrica com

2、mercial corridors. Morocco, Algeria and Egypt are the geopolitical gatekeepers in the competition for three emerging corridors: Moroccos West AfricaWestern Europe corridor, an Algeria-anchored Central Maghreb corridor and an Egypt-based East Africa-Eastern/Central Europe corridor. Undeterred by the

3、Covid-19 pandemic, China, Russia, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states have expanded their economic investments in these countries, reshaping the configuration of the trans-Mediterranean corridors. North Africas leading foreign partners will be the countries that invest in local manufacturing on a strate

4、gically significant scale to create manufacturing value chains. The EU still retains a window of opportunity to influence the direction of EuropeAfrica connectivity to promote European priorities and ensure European interests.European Union | Infrastructures | Transports | Mediterranean | Northkeywo

5、rdsAfrica | Morocco | Algeria | EgyptISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2021:Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic OpportunitiesEuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2021: Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic Opportunitiesby

6、Michal Tanchum*IntroductionFollowing the Covid-19 pandemic, the European Union stands at a critical junction in the international scramble to establish Europe-Africa commercial corridors across the Mediterranean basin. Prior to the pandemics outbreak, the EU already faced a pressing strategic challe

7、nge to form a coherent policy in North Africa, which has become an arena of intense global competition over the new nexus of trade and energy transit routes as well as industrial manufacturing value chains that will connect Europe, Africa and Middle East.During the previous decade, China became Afri

8、cas top trade partner while Russia and Turkey massively expanded their trade relationships on the continent, witnessing rates of growth in trade that surpassed the EU by a factor of seven and five respectively.1 The members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially Saudi Arabia, the United A

9、rab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, have similarly increased their economic engagement with Africa.The pandemic has intensified the urgency for the EU to focus on trans-Mediterranean connectivity. By 2025, Africa will have over a hundred cities with more than one million inhabitants.2 The African Continen

10、tal Free Trade Area,1 From 2006 to 2018, Russias trade with Africa grew by more than 300 per cent and Turkeys by more than 200 per cent, while the European Unions trade with Africa grew by 41 per cent; Economist, “The New Scramble for Africa”, in The Economist, 7 March 2019, leaders/2019/03/07/the-n

11、ew-scramble-for-africa.2 Robert Muggah and Katie Hill, “African Cities Will Double in Population by 2050. Here Are 4 Ways to Make Sure They Thrive”, in World Economic Forum Articles, 27 June 2018, https:/www.weforum.* Michal Tanchum teaches at Universidad de Navarra and is a senior fellow at the Aus

12、trian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES). The author thanks Daniel “Mac” Lang, Matilde Romito, Gabriela Pajuelo and Mara del Pilar Cazali Castan for their research assistance. This paper was prepared in the context of the New-Med Research Network, a project run by the Istituto Affari

13、Internazionali (IAI) with the support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI), the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna and the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation, May 2021. Views expressed are the authors alone.2ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPER

14、S 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2021:Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic Opportunitieslaunched on 1 January 2021, is expected spur international firms to locate even more of their operations in Africa, given its large supply of affordable land and labour, along with its expa

15、nding yet under-served consumer market.3 The post-pandemic global impetus to shorten supply chains has further accelerated this trend as well as the timeframe for investments by international actors. Undeterred by the pandemics severe economic impact, China, Russia, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states h

16、ave expanded their economic involvement in North Africa to reshape the commercial configuration and geopolitics of the trans-Mediterranean connectivity.The fundamental architecture of trans-Mediterranean connectivity consists of the three Europe-Africa corridors: Moroccos West Africa-Western Europe

17、corridor, an Algeria-anchored Central Maghreb corridor and an Egypt-based East Africa-Eastern/Central Europe corridor via the Eastern Mediterranean (Figure 1). Prior to Covid-19s outbreak, Moroccos West Africa-Western Europe corridor was the most advanced in its development while the Egypt-based Eas

18、t Africa-Eastern/Central Europe corridor was at a more preliminary stage, albeit with enormous economic potential. The Algeria-based, central corridor remains in a formative state, characterised by a jockeying among international actors for position. Algerias political paralysis since early spring 2

19、019 and the resultant pause in foreign manufacturing investments endanger the corridors development. A short-term development hiatus amidst tensions with Morocco over the Western Sahara and continued instability in Libya could leave Algeria and Tunisia along with it dangerously isolated and economic

20、ally vulnerable.The recent history of all three corridors shows that if the European Union fails to effectively plan ahead and lay the groundwork for industrial base development and value chain integration in partnership with North African nations, this will leave individual EU member states that pl

21、ay leading roles in trans-Mediterranean connectivity little option other than to partner with actors outside the EU system. This will fuel further intra-EU divisions and undermine the basic objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy as well as the newly announced EU Agenda for the Mediterranean

22、.4org/agenda/2018/06/Africa-urbanization-cities-double-population-2050-4%20ways-thrive.3 Caroline Kende-Robb, “6 Reasons Why Africas New Free Trade Area Is a Global Game Changer”, in World Economic Forum Articles, 9 February 2021, https:/www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/02/ afcfta-africa-free-trade-globa

23、l-game-changer.4 European Commission, Southern Neighbourhood: EU Proposes New Agenda for the Mediterranean,9 February 2021, https:/ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_426.3ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2

24、021:Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic OpportunitiesFigure 1 | EuropeAfrica corridors and connectors to the Trans-African Highway networkNote: West AfricaWestern Europe corridor (green); Central Maghreb corridor (red); East AfricaEastern/Central Europe corridor (blue); AlgeriaLagos Highway (oran

25、ge); Tunis TripoliWidehoekCapetown Highway (yellow); DakarNDjamena Highway (grey); Continuation of CairoAswanKhartoum rail line to Uganda (pink).Source: Michal Tanchum, “Europe-Mediterranean-Africa Commercial Connectivity: Geopolitical Opportunities and Challenges”, in KAS Mediterranean Dialogue Ser

26、ies, No. 31 (November 2020), p. 2, https:/www.kas.de/documents/282499/282548/Europe-Mediterranean-Africa+MED+Dialogue+31.pdf.4ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2021:Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic OpportunitiesOn 9 M

27、arch 2020, the European Commission and the High Representative for EU foreign and security policy issued a joint communication for “a new comprehensive EU strategy with Africa”, based on a programme of “five partnerships” for (1) green transition and energy access; (2) digital transformation; (3) su

28、stainable growth and jobs; (4) peace and governance; and (5) migration and mobility.5 To realise this ambition, the EU should increase investments in trans-Mediterranean connectivity, assisting in the development of local green economy manufacturing sectors integrated in European value chains.Withou

29、t a coherent EU policy to incentivise member states and European firms to cooperate with North African nations, the resulting space left by the European Union in the development of trans-Mediterranean connectivity will be filled by China, Russia, Turkey and the GCC states. Chinas early post-Covid ec

30、onomic recovery has provided Beijing with a first-mover advantage in each of the three emerging trans-Mediterranean commercial corridors, opening the possibility for Beijing to reorient them towards its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework.In the absence of coordinated EU action, the emerging ar

31、chitecture of trans-Mediterranean connectivity is entrenching dangerous divides among the six Mediterranean EU member states as well as exacerbating geopolitical fault lines across North Africa itself. The deepening commercial interests of Turkey, its strategic partner Qatar, and their main regional

32、 rival, the UAE, ensure that all three actors will remain engaged across North Africa.North Africas leading foreign partners in trans-Mediterranean connectivity will be the countries that invest in infrastructure that is directly tied to Europe-Africa manufacturing value chains. With the European Ne

33、ighbourhood Policys “strong focus on good governance, democracy and the rule of law”,6 the EU must navigate additional challenges in developing its trans-Mediterranean partnerships not faced by other international actors. Still, the EU retains a critical window of opportunity to impact the direction

34、 of trans-Mediterranean connectivity. The manner and extent to which the EU exercises leadership in the development of trans-Mediterranean connectivity will determine the parameters of its future geopolitical influence in North Africa and the effectiveness of the EUs Africa partnership strategy over

35、all.1. The West AfricaWestern Europe Corridor: The model of MoroccoMoroccos success in advancing its West Africa-to-Western Europe corridor stems from the considerable investments made by Rabat and its foreign partners in the concurrent development of Moroccos transportation infrastructure and its5

36、European Commission, Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa (JOIN/2020/4), 9 March2020, https:/eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004.6 EU Neighbours portal: The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), https:/www.euneighbours.eu/ en/node/11210.5ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-

37、9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2021:Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic Opportunitiesindustrial base, anchoring Moroccos emerging trans-Mediterranean commercial connectivity in manufacturing value chains.7Figure 2 | High-speed rail lines in Moroc

38、co, including planned extensions of the al-Boraq LineSource: Wikipedia Commons: Railways of Morocco as per 2018, https:/commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Railways_Morocco.2018.png.Prior to the pandemic, Moroccos 2018 inauguration of the al-Boraq high-speed rail line Africas first high-speed rail trans

39、portation connecting Tangier to Casablanca consolidated Moroccos unrivalled position as a Europe-Africa commercial corridor (Figure 2). The first segment of the 2.3 billion US dollars, 362 km rail-link was built as a Franco-Moroccan joint venture. The Boraq line is linked to Moroccos new state-of-th

40、e-art Tanger Med port on the countrys Mediterranean coast 40 km east of Tangier. In June 2019, Tanger Med became the Mediterraneans7 Michal Tanchum, “Moroccos Africa-to-Europe Corridor: Gatekeeper of a Trans-Regional Strategic Architecture”, in AIES Fokus, No. 8/2020 (July 2020), https:/www.aies.at/

41、publikationen/2020/ fokus-20-08.php.6ISSN 2610-9603 | ISBN 978-88-9368-194-0 2021 IAIIAI PAPERS 21 | 20 - MAY 2021EuropeAfrica Connectivity Outlook 2021:Post-Covid-19 Challenges and Strategic Opportunitieslargest port with a total container capacity of 9 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), s

42、urpassing Spains Algeciras and Valencia ports. The 1.5 billion US dollars capacity expansion was supported by substantial Chinese investment,8 but China has failed to capitalise on the investment as Beijing has so far been unsuccessful in establishing an independent, Chinese-led manufacturing chain

43、in Morocco.The importance of integrating infrastructure investment with industrial manufacturing chains is illustrated by Moroccos successful automotive industry, producing over 700,000 vehicles annually and serving as the western corridors centrepiece. In 2012, Groupe Renault established a second M

44、oroccan manufacturing plant in Tangier to benefit from the expanded Tanger Med Port and rail link. In 2019, Europes third largest automaker sent six trainloads of Renault vehicles daily from its Tangier factory to the Tanger Med port for shipment.9 In June 2019, Frances Groupe PSA, Europes second la

45、rgest automaker, opened a manufacturing plant in Knitra, north of Rabat, because of the Boraq high-speed rail link to the Tanger Med port.10In early 2019, automotive sectors sales accounted for 27.6 per cent of Moroccos exports.11 Moroccos present vehicle production led by Groupe Renault and Groupe

46、PSA is supported by approximately 200 international suppliers operating their own manufacturing plants in the country, including major firms headquartered in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Belgium. Some Chinese manufacturers are using the opportunity of Groupe PSAs new plant in Knitra to integrate into the French-led European value chain, such as CITIC