走向智能推荐RAND：China_And_The_International_Order.pdf

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1、C O R P O R AT I O NChinaAND THEInternational OrderMichael J.MazarrTimothy R.HeathAstrid Stuth CevallosBUILDING A SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDERA RAND Project to Explore U.S.Strategy in a Changing WorldLimited Print and Electronic Distribution RightsThis document and trademark(s)contained herein ar

2、e protected by law.This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only.Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited.Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only,as long as it is unaltered and complete.Permission is require

3、d from RAND to reproduce,or reuse in another form,any of its research documents for commercial use.For information on reprint and linking permissions,please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help

4、 make communities throughout the world safer and more secure,healthier and more prosperous.RAND is nonprofit,nonpartisan,and committed to the public interest.RANDs publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RANDMake a tax-deductible charitable c

5、ontribution at www.rand.org/giving/contributewww.rand.orgLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.ISBN:978-1-9774-0062-8For more information on this publication,visit www.rand.org/t/RR2423Published by the RAND Corporation,Santa Monica,Calif.Copyright 2018

6、RAND CorporationR is a registered trademark.Cover image by Kagenmi/iiiPrefaceThis report is part of a larger RAND study on the future of the postWorld War II liberal international order.The overall project is examin-ing the theoretical and historical foundations of the order,its current status and p

7、rospects,and policy options for the future.This report represents our analysis of Chinas approach to a multilateral order and draws implications from that analysis for future U.S.policy.This research was sponsored by the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and conducte

8、d within the Inter-national Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute,a federally funded research and develop-ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,the Joint Staff,the Unified Combatant Commands,the Navy,the Marine Corps,the defense

9、agencies,and the defense Intelligence Community.For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center,see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the Center director(contact information is provided on the webpage).vContentsPreface.iiiTables.viiSummary.ixAcknowledgm

10、ents.xviiAbbreviations.xixCHAPTER ONEIntroduction.1Defining the International Order.5Methodology and Approach.9CHAPTER TWOChinas Interests and Ambitions.13Chinas Core Interests.13Xi Jinpings Report at the 19th Party Congress.18Differing Views of Chinas Intentions.20CHAPTER THREEChinas Views of Inter

11、national Order.25Support for Institutions That Grant China Influence.27Appreciation for Rules-Based,Multilateral Mechanisms.29Contestation of Western Values and U.S.Military Power.29Criticism of U.S.Exceptionalism.30Criticism of Military Interventionism .31vi China and the International OrderCHAPTER

12、 FOURChinas Behavior Toward the Order.33China and International Institutions.34China and International Norms.39Chinas Compliance with the Orders Rule Sets.48Chinas Role in Shared Security Issues.55Emerging Wild Card:The“Long Arm of Chinas Influence”.56Chinas Behavior Toward the Postwar International

13、 Order.58CHAPTER FIVEThe Future of Chinas Interaction with the International Order.69Geostrategic Trends and Changes to International Order.71Growing Chinese Dependence on International Order.75How China Seeks to Reform the International Order.77Restructuring the Asia-Pacific Region:A Foretaste of t

14、he Future?.84The Intensifying Competition for Political Influence.89Which Parts of the Order Is China Likely to Challenge?.92Conclusion:A Modified or Subverted Order?.99CHAPTER SIXThree Trajectories for China and the International Order.103A Spectrum of Futures.108Implications for U.S.Policy.114Prep

15、aring for a Range of Possible Futures.116CHAPTER SEVENConclusions and Recommendations.119Toward a Stable Competition in the Context of a Shared Order.119Putting Chinas Approach to the Postwar Order into Perspective.121U.S.Strategy Toward China and a Shared Order.123References.135viiTables 2.1.Chinas

16、 Core Interests.15 4.1.Chinas Participation in Major International Institutions.35 4.2.Opposition to International InstitutionsChina and the United States.36 4.3.States Initiating Militarized Interstate Disputes,19902010.45 4.4.Chinas Behavior Toward Primary Subcomponents of Postwar Order.60 5.1.Chi

17、nas Potential for Changing the International Order.100 6.1.Alternative Chinese Strategies Toward International Order.109ixSummaryThis report evaluates the character and possible future of Chinas engagement with the postWorld War II international order.The resulting portrait is anything but straightf

18、orward:Chinas engagement with the order remains a complex and often contradictory work in progress.In the Maoist era,China frequently maintained an antago-nistic posture to the international system.However,since the advent of the reform and opening-up period in the late 1970s,the trajectory of China

19、s policy toward the postwar order has been more supportive.It has joined hundreds of leading institutions,gradually boosted its direct and indirect support for many multilateral activities and norms,and expressed a commitment to increasing its role in global governance.However,following precedents s

20、et by other great powers,China as an increasingly powerful nation has also demonstrated a willingness to challenge and revise aspects of the existing order.In some cases,it has created institutions,such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank(AIIB),that are more responsive to Chinese interests b

21、ut may duplicate existing institutionssuggesting competition.On other issues,such as human rights,Beijing has conditioned its support on a redefinition of key terms to reflect Chinas preferences.In still other cases,such as trade and nonproliferation,China has supported key normsbut its behavior fal

22、ls far short of complete compliance and,in some cases(as in its industrial policy),seems actively calculated to circumvent the spirit of the norms.This report evaluates the character and possible future of Chinas engagement with the postwar international order as part of a larger RAND study on the f

23、uture of the postwar liberal international order,x China and the International Orderthe Project on Building a Sustainable International Order.To make this assessment,the analysis examined Chinas participation in interna-tional institutions,adherence to international norms,compliance with established

24、 rule sets,and broad level of support for multilateral coor-dination and problem-solving under the aegis of the postwar order.RAND researchers consulted available evidence on Chinas behavior in these areas;analyzed Chinese official documents and scholarly writ-ings;reviewed recent activities and tre

25、nds;gathered data on several especially important issue areas,such as evidence of Chinese compli-ance with nonproliferation and activities within the United Nations(UN);and brought together a number of subject-matter experts for a roundtable to evaluate key evidence.The biggest wild card is the ques

26、tion of where Chinas policy is headed over the medium term,roughly the next decade.The direc-tives contained in the 19th Party Congress suggest that China intends to adopt a bolder approach toward questions of international leader-ship,becoming more deeply involved in key institutions and issues,suc

27、h as peacekeeping and climate change.At the same time,China may also step up efforts to challenge norms favoring liberal democratic values that it has long opposed.Because China is unlikely to surpass the United States by virtually any measure of national power any time soon,China is unlikely to dis

28、place the United States as the global norm-setting power.However,Chinas burgeoning power is already intensi-fying competition with the United States for leadership and influence within the international system,primarily at the regional level but also increasingly at the global level.Indeed,on select

29、 issue areas(such as climate change)and in some geographic areas(such as some countries affected by the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road known as the Belt and Road Initiative),Chinese influence could surpass that of the United States.Whether a grow-ing competition

30、 for influence and leadership with the United States in shaping the terms of the international order escalates into dynamics that become destructive of that order remains to be determined.One major challenge in this study,therefore,is that the ques-tion of Chinas future approach to the international

31、 order is bound up inextricably with broader strategic questions regarding the evolu-Summary xition of Chinese power,the vitality of the international system,and the firmness of the U.S.commitment to leading that international order.The evolution of these variables cannot be predicted with confidenc

32、e.Any analysis of Chinas approach to a shared international orderand possibly U.S.strategy and policy responses to that approachmust take seriously the fact that it is dealing with a moving target.Cur-rently available data and interpretations do not allow an unqualified medium-term judgment.Taking t

33、his larger context into accountas well as the complex-ity of Chinas behavior to datethis study offers three major findings about the relationship of China to the international order.First,China can be expected to demand more influence in the interna-tional system as a condition for its support.Broad

34、ly speaking,since China undertook a new policy of international engagement in the 1980sand putting aside the areas(liberal values and human rights)in which the Chinese Communist Party has the greatest degree of conflict with the U.S.-led orderthe level and quality of its participation in the order r

35、ival those of most other nations.It has come to see multilateral institutions and processes as important,if not essential,for the achieve-ment of its interests.However,like the United States and other major powers,an increasingly powerful China has demanded exceptions to the rules and norms when it

36、sees vital interests at stake.Moreover,as its role in the international community grows,China will likely demand changes to institutions and norms to reflect its power and value prefer-ences as a condition for its support.Indeed,at the 19th Party Congress in 2017,President Xi Jinping called for Chin

37、a to become a“global leader”in terms of comprehensive national power and“international influence”by mid-century.However,these demands are not likely to contest the fundamental nature of the international system.Second,looking forward,a strengthened and increasingly multi-lateral international order

38、can continue to provide a critical tool for the United States and other countries to shape and constrain rising Chinese power.The growing collective strength of the developing world opens opportunities for the United States to engage these countries as part-ners in building a more-resilient internat

39、ional order.This is true for two major reasons.First,reforms that accommodate the interests of rising xii China and the International Orderpowers through greater multilateralism can make the international system more responsive and robust.Second,a widely supported multi-lateral system provides the U

40、nited States with greater leverage:Involve-ment by more countries can also help fashion norms against which individual countries are judged for their status,prestige,and influ-ence.This can,in turn,incentivize China to participate and restrain its behavior or risk prompting a multilateral balancing

41、process grounded in the norms of a mutually agreed order.Examples of reforms to build multilateralism and strengthen norms include measures to expand the role of China and other developing economies in the International Monetary Fund(IMF)and to increase Chinese involvement in medi-ating internationa

42、l conflicts through the UN.Reforms to accommo-date the interests of China and other rising powers alone are unlikely to determine Chinese behavior.Strong U.S.leadership,backed by mili-tary strength and in cooperation with its network of allies and part-ners,will remain essential to deterring China f

43、rom considering the most egregious and dangerous acts of aggression against its neighbors.However,a resilient and responsive multilateral order can play a critical role in incentivizing China to operate primarily within,as opposed to outside,international institutions.Finally,modifications to the or

44、der on the margins in response to Chi-nese preferences will typically pose less of a threat to a stable international system than a future in which China is alienated from that system.Some observers have expressed concern about the implications of alternative standards or institutions promoted by Ch

45、ina,such as the establishment of the AIIB,to enable development-related investments in Asia without the conditions(in terms of human rights,rule of law,or labor or envi-ronmental standards)that typically accompany efforts by the existing Asian Development Bank.Although Chinese-led initiatives do cha

46、l-lenge U.S.leadership and influence,they generally do not pose a threat to the fundamental integrity of the international system.Because an international system that features a greater Chinese presence but remains stable and effective would favor U.S.interests more than a conflict-ridden internatio

47、nal system in which China is alienated,the United States should seek ways to participate in Chinese-led initia-Summary xiiitives and appropriately expand opportunities for Chinese involvement in existing institutions.In considering Chinas future role in the order,the United States can take reassuran

48、ce from the high degree of legitimacy and trust in the international system expressed by most countries,although polls do indicate that China has made remarkable strides in narrowing the gap in favorability with the United States in the past few years.1 By many measures,including gross domestic prod

49、uct and defense spend-ing,the United States will remain the worlds most powerful country for the foreseeable future and thus will remain the most essential leader in the international order.Overall,China has viewed U.S.leadership as having contributed to international peace and prosperity in some im

50、portant ways,even if its differences with the United States have grown over time.Chinas role in shaping Asias economic and security order is likely to be the most contentious part of its foreign policy in the future.Chi-nas determination to become Asias paramount power will unavoid-ably entail an in