胡佛研究所-私人数据公共监管(英)-2021-28正式版.ppt
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1、A HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAYPrivate Data/Public RegulationBARRY FRIEDMANAegis Series Paper No.2105IntroductionPolice collect informationthat is what they do,and they could not do it without help.No doubt from the beginning of policing,officers have relied upon private parties to aidtheir investigation
2、s.Tipsters tip,snitches are paid,and well-meaning denizens share theinformation they possess.At crime scenes,police collect the names of people who mayhave seen something and follow up on those leads.And for the most part this has been,and remains,unregulated.But there has been a sea change,brought
3、upon us by technology,a change so dramatic ithas transformed policing itself.Increasingly,the information police collect is digital.Fewersearch warrants,more requests for orders to harvest metadata.Purchasing large pools ofprivate data from data brokers.Capturing location information in various ways
4、.Tappinginto a network of private security cameras.And so on.Sometimes police collect the datathemselves.More often they gather it from third parties.They do so from volunteers,bypurchase,and by court order.1The digital nature of the data allows it to be acquired in bulk.Rather than just focusingon
5、the target of a particular investigation,the government can gather the informationindiscriminately about large swaths of the population or even about all of us.2 This wasthe case with the National Security Agencys collection of our telephone metadata,but italso is the case at the local level by auto
6、mated license plate readers.3The uses of this data are so broad that it is not just what we traditionally think of as the“police”who gather the data,but a variety of government entities involved in public safetyand law enforcement.Bulk data collection has allowed law enforcement to shift its focusfr
7、om a reactive investigative stance to a proactive and deterrent one.The police long haveinvestigated particular cases,with suspects they had in mind or were trying to identify.4Now,government agencies utilize large databases to predict where crime will occur,or minethem for evidence of criminality.5
8、 This occurs without a particular suspect in mind and isaimed more broadly at the entire population or a segment of it.No doubt this data collection has value,but precisely how much is an open question,and may depend in part on its use.For example,data collected from third parties,suchas genetic inf
9、ormation,has helpedto solve cold cases.6 Facial recognition was vital toidentifying the insurrectionists of January 6,2021.7 These are investigative uses.Here,the2value is plain,but the extent of that value unknown.The utility of bulk data collectionfor predictive or deterrent purposes is far more u
10、ncertain.8 In truth there is far too littleassessment of the utility of these new techniques,for whatever purpose they are deployed.But one thing is clear:placing this much personal data in the hands of the government hasits costs.It endangers our personal security,and our sense of privacy.It threat
11、ens our rightto associate,including for political activity.It puts enormous power in the government tocontrol behavior.And too often the collection is disproportionately of people of color.Im going to make a novel argument that,if adopted,would allow for capturing the benefitsof data-driven policing
12、,while mitigating its costs.My argument is that government agenciesthat engage in policing cannot collect digital data,particularly about individuals for whomthere is no suspicion of wrongdoing,without a sufficient regulatory scheme in place.Thus,if these practices are to continue,legislative bodies
13、 must step in and adopt regulation.Whats novel about my argument is that I frame it in constitutional terms.Im not justarguing that regulation is desirable as a normative matter.My precise claim is that asa matter of constitutional law,unauthorized and unregulated bulk digital collection ofsurveilla
14、nce data simply may not occur.Absent such authorization and regulation,courtsshould invalidate such collection.More bluntly:with or without court intervention,government agencies involved in the policing function should cease immediately whatthey are doing until sufficient authorization and regulati
15、on is in place.I support my argument by showing that in many contexts,under a number of constitutionalamendments,when government seeks to collect personal information,courts impose a setof“requisites”before such collection is mandated or upheld.These requisites include thatthe collection of data is
16、statutorily authorized,that it furthers a legitimate governmentpurpose,that collection is minimized to protect privacy and personal security,that accessto the data is safeguarded,and that judicial review is available to challenge the collection,retention,and use of such data.Note that virtually all
17、of this is missing from todays collection of surveillance data bygovernment.That is what must change.I am not arguing government cannot collect thedata,but that before it does,authorization and regulation by a democratically accountablebody is essential.This puts the decision to collect the data,and
18、 minimal safeguards attendantthereto,in proper hands,rather than letting government policing officials simply decide forthemselves.Although I hope it has very basic normative appeal,my argument is a complex one witha number of moving pieces.Im not going to have the space to lay it all out here,butI
19、am doing so in other work.9 In Part I,I will describe the phenomenon of widespreaddigital surveillance data collection that draws my attention.In Part II,I will sketch out myBarry Friedman Private Data/Public Regulation3argument,briefly but in full.Part III then will hone in on the body of constitut
20、ional lawcentral to my argument,the cases I describe just above.Part IV will all-too-briefly touch onrelated parts of the argument and conclude.II want to begin by briefly describing the developments that motivate the paper and tohighlight two particular aspects.First,although many have expressed al
21、arm that privatecompanies are collecting and aggregating enormous amounts of data about us,governmentsare building similar databases on their own for law enforcement purposes.There may bebenefits to all this,but there surely are costs.Yet,second,the Constitution as presentlyconstruedparticularly the
22、 Fourth Amendmenthas proven of little value in regulating thepractice of data collection,retention,and use.In the absence of constitutional regulation,there has been some legislative intervention,but far less than is necessary to cover the fieldor bring government surveillance data collection under
23、the control it requires.I.APolicing agencies at the national and local level are building vast databases to keep tabson us all.The FBI is constructing an enormous biometric database that will include facialimages,iris scans,voice and palm prints.10 New York is one of several cities with an extensive
24、Domain Awareness system,which collects and aggregates information from a networkthat includes over 9,000 cameras,500 license plate readers,and data from governmentdatabases.11 No longer content with using state-run and regulated DNA databases,localdepartments have begun creating their own versions,s
25、natching DNA in any way they canget it:by surreptitiously nabbing beverage cups from people they suspect,to asking consentfrom victims or people they wish to clear in investigations,and then retaining it.12 Thepolice use technology like from the company Cellebrite to vacuum up thecontents of cellpho
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