大西洋理事会-下一个国防战略必须正确对待俄罗斯（英）-2022.pdf

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1、Introduction Every US National Defense Strategy(NDS)must grapple with fundamen-tal trade-offs to address the myriad security threats facing the United States and its allies and partners.As the Biden administration prepares to launch the next NDS in early 2022,it is evident that this key document wil

2、l emphasize strategic competition with China,following the trajectory of the 2017 National Security Strategy(NSS),the 2018 NDS,and the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.1 Given“strategic simultane-ity”among numerous geopolitical and nontraditional threats,including China,Russia,Iran,

3、North Korea,violent extremists,pandemics,and cli-mate change,prioritizing China as the pacing threat is certainly necessary to guide key Department of Defense(DoD)imperatives for force modern-ization,resource allocation,and alliance coordination.2 1 The White House,National Security Strategy of the

4、United States of America,December 2017,https:/trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf;Department of Defense,Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:Sharpening the American Militarys Competitive Edge,January 2018,http

5、s:/dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf;and the White House,Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,March 2021,https:/www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.2 In their 2021 Atlantic Council report,Seizing the Advantage:A Vision f

6、or the Next US National Defense Strategy,the authors define“strategic simultaneity”as the phenomenon of confronting multiple major threats at the same time.In particular,“In a world of intensifying multipolarity among more advanced state and non-state actors,the United States may still be the strong

7、est power by many metrics,but it cannot overwhelm every threat simultaneously.”Consequently,addressing this challenge“requires realistic assessments of critical national and allied interests,the actors and trends that threaten them,and the opportunities for countering them.”For more on this issue,se

8、e Clementine G.Starling,Lt Col Tyson K.Wetzel,and Christian S.Trotti,Seizing the Advantage:A Vision for the Next US National Defense Strategy,Atlantic Council,December 2021,25,https:/www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Seizing-the-Advantage_A-Vision-for-the-Next-US-National-Defense-St

9、rategy.pdf.The Next National Defense Strategy Must Get Russia RightISSUE BRIEFThe Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable,nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners.The Center honors th

10、e legacy of service of General Brent Scowcroft and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security,support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners,and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders.Forward Defense(FD)shapes the debate around th

11、e greatest defense challenges facing the United States and its allies,and creates forward-looking assessments of the trends,technologies,and concepts that will define the future of warfare.Through the futures we forecast,the scenarios we wargame,and the analyses we produce,FD develops actionable str

12、ategies to help the United States navigate major-power conflict and defend forward,alongside allies and partners.As the character of war rapidly changes,FD assesses the operational concepts and defense-industrial tools necessary to effectively deter and defend against emerging military challenges.Op

13、inions,conclusions,and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Department of Defense,the Air Force,the Army,the Marine Corps,the Navy,or any other US government agency.CLEMENTINE G.STARLING,CHRISTIAN S.TROTTI,an

14、d LT COL TYSON K.WETZELFEBRUARY 20222ATLANTIC COUNCILISSUE BRIEFThe Next National Defense Strategy Must Get Russia RightHowever,prevailing policy discourse often neglects Russia as a major revisionist challenger to the international system.3 It would be a mistake for the NDS to inadequately address

15、Russian actions over the past two decades,including the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea,continuous Russian hybrid attacks(such as cyber-attacks,election interference,and influence operations that include disinformation),the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War in Donbas and

16、beyond,and most recently the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine.While the United States needs to focus on China,Russia continues to pose a grave threat to US interests in Europe.4 In particular,the ongoing 2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis raises a key question for US defe

17、nse policy makers as they final-ize the next NDS:How can the NDS get Russia“right”?This issue brief seeks to answer this question by developing a US defense strategy for deterring and managing the Russian threat in Europe and beyond,building upon insights from the authors December 2021 report,Seizin

18、g the Advantage:A Vision for the Next US National Defense Strategy.5 The strat-egy advances three foundational pillars:1)countering Russian gray-zone activities and taking the offensive;2)meaningfully 3 Franco Ordoez,“The White House wants to focus on China,but Russia continues to be a distraction,”

19、NPR,December 21,2021,https:/www.npr.org/2021/12/21/1066181618/the-white-house-wants-to-focus-on-china-but-russia-continues-to-be-a-distraction.4 Starling,Wetzel,and Trotti,Seizing the Advantage,22;Office of the Director of National Intelligence,Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Communi

20、ty,April 9,2021,911,https:/www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf;and Natalia Zinets and Aleksandar Vasovic,“Russia invades Ukraine in Europes darkest hours since WWII,”Reuters,February 24,2022,https:/ Starling,Wetzel,and Trotti,Seizing the Advantage.6 The Whit

21、e House,Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.integrating allies and partners;and 3)adopting a more glob-ally oriented force posture model.This approach can be im-plemented regardless of the outcome of the current crisis,but the degree to which it is followed should depend upon the severity o

22、f the crisis as it evolves.Moreover,these de-fense recommendations should be integrated into a broader,coherent NDS that comprehensively addresses the myriad of threats facing the United States and its allies and partners,and they must be paired with an equally robust approach in the NSS that articu

23、lates other departments roles in the diplo-matic,economic,and other elements of this challenge.Priority Security Goals in EuropeAny strategy must begin with clear goals.This issue brief assumes that US security and defense goals in Europe will remain largely consistent with recent policy and with th

24、e over-arching vision articulated by US President Joseph R.Biden,Jr.,in his administrations Interim National Security Strategic Guidanceand that they will not change significantly in re-sponse to the Russo-Ukrainian crisis.6 The next NDS should continue to prioritize the following goals in Europe:Le

25、arning Lessons from the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian CrisisAt the time of publication,after Russia had deployed well over one hundred thousand troops in Belarus and on its border with Ukraine,Russian forces have initiated a large-scale and multi-front offensive into Ukrainian territory.Regardless of the mil

26、itary and geopolitical outcomes of this rapidly developing crisis,the US defense establishment must study Russias actions during the crisis and learn critical lessons that can be applied to revising its defense strat-egy toward Russia.One example is the evolving Russian way of war.The Kremlin has de

27、monstrated what a future Russian offensive force could look like,consisting of:cyberattacks and influence operations that include mis-and disinformation in the gray zone;a large,mechanized ground force supported by lethal airpower and air defense forces;and a moderately sized surface and subsurface

28、naval fleet.This evolving way of war should inform the United States approach to hybrid con-flict,integration with allies and partners,and European force posture in the future.3ATLANTIC COUNCILThe Next National Defense Strategy Must Get Russia RightISSUE BRIEF1.Protect and assure the sovereignty and

29、 territorial in-tegrity of NATO allies.This means deterring and com-bating both conventional military threats and hybrid activities below the threshold of armed conflict.2.Safeguard a stable Europe free from aggression.A stable Europe is one in which both NATO and non-NATO countries enjoy secure bor

30、ders,sovereignty over their respective territory,and economic vitality,thereby setting the conditions for transatlantic peace and trade.Attacks on countries like Ukraine can pre-cipitate major adverse consequences for stability,including refugee migrations and economic devasta-tion,and significantly

31、 alter the European status quo,which will require US policy makers to choose be-tween:a)accepting it and deterring further changes,or b)restoring the status quo ante through a compel-lent approach.7 7 See upcoming analysis from Clementine G.Starling on the strategic crossroads facing NATO following

32、the latest Russo-Ukrainian crisis.8 Matthew Crouch,Barry Pavel,Clementine G.Starling,and Christian Trotti,A New Strategy for US Global Defense Posture,Atlantic Council,August 2021,https:/www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/strategic-insights-memos/a-new-strategy-for-us-global-defense-posture/.3.E

33、nhance defense integration with European allies and partners.A strong and unified Europe is a sig-nificant deterrent to opportunistic Russian aggres-sion.Accordingly,one key US goal is to enhance peacetime and wartime integration and coordination among NATO allies and non-NATO partners,to in-clude b

34、olstering interoperability,undertaking exer-cises,and potentially pursuing a“latticed”approach that leverages allied capabilities and encourages allies and partners to work together and with the United States.8 4.Maintain access to key geostrategic“high grounds”and choke points that are critical to

35、the United States ability to conduct military operations in Europe.This must include improving Baltic Sea re-gional security;ensuring access to the strategically important Black Sea;preventing Russia from con-Members of the US and Slovak armed forces hold a memorial service for Slovakian war hero,Ca

36、pt.Edward Baranski,during Operation Atlantic Resolve(OAR)at Slia Air Base,Slovakia on July 15,2016.The memorial included static displayed aircraft,as well as a flyover of two A-10C Thunderbolt IIs and a MiG-29 aircraft.Airmen of the 163rd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron were taking part in OAR to con

37、duct training and familiarization events alongside the Slovak armed forces,a NATO ally.Source:US Air National Guard photo/Staff Sgt.William Hopper,US Air Force flickr.4ATLANTIC COUNCILISSUE BRIEFThe Next National Defense Strategy Must Get Russia Righttrolling the Greenland,Iceland,and United Kingdom

38、(GIUK)gap in the northern Atlantic Ocean;and secur-ing key physical and digital telecommunications infra-structure,such as undersea cables and satellites.The Russian Threat“The Russian threat is not nearly as comprehensive as the Chinese threat,but it also transcends multiple elements of national po

39、wer.Unlike in Beijing,leaders in Moscow recognize that they are not powerful enough to entirely displace the international order,so they instead seek to disrupt it at every viable opportunity,primarily because they perceive the democratic values espoused by that or-der as an existential threat.Russi

40、a expertly manages and employs its limited means.”9There is a pervasive perception in the DoD that Russia is a“declining power”relative to the United States and China.Such a perception hampers proactive approaches to the Russian challenge.Russia still maintains both the intention and the capability

41、to significantly disrupt US interests in Europe.10 The Kremlin values influence in its“near abroad”and perceives democratic systems as an existential threat to its autocratic regimetherefore,it seeks to aggressively interfere with NATO democracies and intervene against its neighbors.11 And while Rus

42、sia is not a near-peer pacing threat like China,the Kremlin understands that it can still opportunistically pursue its objectives through a carefully calibrated toolset.This includes“an escalate-to-deesca-late nuclear doctrinea growing arsenal of nonstrategic and exotic nuclear weaponsand a variety

43、of hybrid tools such as political warfare,election interference,energy ma-nipulation,mercenaries,and special operations,all of which are designed to divide the NATO alliance and sow fears of escalation among transatlantic states.”12 As a result,armed conflict with Russia on the European continent ha

44、s grown 9 Starling,Wetzel,and Trotti,Seizing the Advantage,22.10 Samuel Charap,“Expanding the Scope for Statecraft in U.S.Russia Policy,”War on the Rocks,May 14,2021,https:/ Intelligence Council,Global Trends 2040:A More Contested World,March 2021,9596,https:/www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessm

45、ents/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf;and Andrew Latham,“Reports of Russias decline are greatly exaggerated,”The Hill,December 26,2021,https:/ Starling,Wetzel,and Trotti,Seizing the Advantage,22;and Office of the Director of National Intelligence,Annual Threat Assessment,911.12 Starling,Wetzel,and Trotti,Seizi

46、ng the Advantage,22.13 Ibid.,25.14 Department of State,“The Ironclad U.S.Commitment to NATO,”Office of the Spokesperson,Fact Sheet,November 29,2021,https:/www.state.gov/the-ironclad-u-s-commitment-to-nato/#:text=As%20it%20approaches%20its%2073rd,in%20Europe%20and%20North%20America.15 Office of the D

47、irector of National Intelligence,Annual Threat Assessment,911.16 Charap,“Expanding the Scope.”increasingly possible,and perhaps more probable than con-flict with China in the near term.The United States cannot simply ignore Russia and must continue to balance against both Chinese and Russian revisio

48、nism at the same time.13 Russian aggression has particularly exacerbated the stra-tegic and operational environment in Europe over the past two decades,holding at risk the four priority security goals outlined above.Thus far,longstanding US commitment to its NATO allies has been successful in deterr

49、ing conven-tional Russian military incursions into NATO territory.14 While many non-NATO countries in Russias“near abroad,”including Ukraine,Belarus,and Georgia,contain Russian troops,NATO allies territorial integrity remains intact.While this is certainly a success,US goals are at risk in other way

50、s.Russia continues to:violate NATO sovereignty through political warfare,election interference,disinfor-mation,and other hybrid tools below the threshold of conventional conflict;destabilize Europe by occupying and interfering in non-NATO countries;and menace key geostrategic“high grounds”like the B