调整美国—以色列在科技和中国问题上的合作（英）-新美国安全中心-2022.pdf

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1、Aligning U.S.-Israeli Cooperation on Technology Issues and China Jonathan Schanzer,Shira Efron,Martijn Rasser,and Alice HicksonMARCH 2022About the AuthorsDr.Jonathan Schanzer is senior vice president for research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies(FDD)where he oversees the work of the orga

2、nizations experts and scholars.He is also on the leadership team of FDDs Center on Economic and Financial Power,a project on the use of financial and economic power as a tool of statecraft.Schanzer previously worked as a terrorism finance analyst at the U.S.Department of the Treasury where he played

3、 an integral role in the designation of numerous terrorist financiers.He has held previous think tank research positions at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Middle East Forum.Dr.Shira Efron is director of research at Israeli Policy Forum,a senior research fellow at the Institute

4、 for National Security Studies,and an adjunct fellow with the RAND Corporation.Her research focus is U.S.Middle East policy and the nexus between climate change and national security.Her studies are featured regularly in Israeli and international media outlets.Previously,Dr.Efron was a Middle East a

5、nalyst at several think tanks in Washington,D.C.,including the Center for American Progress and Middle East Institute.She has a PhD and MPhil in policy analysis from RANDs Graduate School,an MA in international relations/international business from New York University,and a BSc in biology(major)and

6、computer science(minor)from Tel Aviv University.She is a member of the board of directors of Deborah Forum,which promotes women in the security establishment.Martijn Rasser is Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at CNAS.Previously he served as a senior intellig

7、ence officer and analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.Upon leaving government service,Rasser was chief of staff at Muddy Waters Capital,an investment research firm.More recently he served as director of analysis at Kyndi,a venture-backed artificial intelligence start-up.Rasser holds a BA in an

8、thropology from Bates College and an MA in security studies from Georgetown University.Alice Hickson is a former Joseph S.Nye Jr.Intern for the Middle East Security Program at CNAS.She previously interned at the Council on Foreign Relations as well as the Convergence Center for Policy Resolution.Add

9、itionally,she studied abroad in Amman,Jordan,where she conducted independent quantitative and qualitative research as a senior thesis scholar on Palestinian refugees and the right of return.Hickson recently graduated from Tufts University,majoring in international relations and Middle Eastern studie

10、s.About the CNAS Middle East Security ProgramThe Middle East Security Program conducts cutting-edge research on the most pressing issues in the turbulent region.The program focuses on the sources of instability there,maintaining key U.S.strategic partnerships,and generating solutions that help polic

11、ymakers respond to both fast-moving events and long-term trends.The Middle East Security Program draws on a team with deep government and nongovernment experience in regional studies,U.S.foreign policy,and international security.It analyzes trends and generates practical and implementable policy sol

12、utions that defend and advance U.S.interests.About the CNAS Technology ProgramTechnology is changing our lives.Rapid developments in artificial intelligence,autonomous and unmanned systems,digital infrastructure,networking and social media,and disinformation are profoundly altering the national secu

13、rity landscape.Nation-states have new tools at their disposal for political influence as well as new vulnerabilities to attacks.Authoritarian governments are empowered by high-tech tools of oppression and exploit radical transparency.Artificial intelligence and automation raise profound questions ab

14、out the role of humans in conflict and war.CNAS Technology and National Security program explores the policy challenges as-sociated with these and other emerging technologies.A key focus of the program is bringing together the technology and policy communities to better understand these challenges a

15、nd together develop solutions.AcknowledgmentsThe authors are grateful to the many officials and expertsboth in the United States and elsewherewho shared their perspectives throughout the duration of the project.The authors would like to give a special acknowledgement to Ilan Goldenberg for his contr

16、ibutions to this report,from its inception to the final product.They would also like to recognize Emily Kilcrease from CNAS;Mark Dubowitz and Jacob Nagel from FDD;and Doron Ella,Galia Lavi,and Assaf Orion from INSS for their support and contributions.This report would not be possible without the wor

17、k of Melody Cook,Maura McCarthy,and Emma Swislow,who assisted with the production of this paper.This report was made possible with the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation.As a research and policy institution committed to the highest standards of organizational,intellectual,and person

18、al integrity,CNAS maintains strict intellectual independence and sole editorial direction and control over its ideas,projects,publications,events,and other research activities.CNAS does not take institutional positions on policy issues and the content of CNAS publications reflects the views of their

19、 authors alone.In keeping with its mission and values,CNAS does not engage in lobbying activity and complies fully with all applicable federal,state,and local laws.CNAS will not engage in any representational activities or advocacy on behalf of any entities or interests and,to the extent that the Ce

20、nter accepts funding from non-U.S.sources,its activities will be limited to bona fide scholastic,academic,and research-related activities,consistent with applicable federal law.The Center publicly acknowledges on its website annually all donors who contribute.TABLE OF CONTENTS01 Executive Summary02

21、Background06 Recommendations15 ConclusionMIDDLE EAST SECURITY&TECHNOLOGY|MARCH 2022Aligning U.S.-Israeli Cooperation on Technology Issues and China1TExecutive Summaryhe United States and Israel have a long history of working together as close allies.Theirs is a rela-tionship based on common values a

22、nd security interests.In recent years,the alliances highlights have included close cooperation on counterterrorism and intelligence,as well as deepening economic ties,techno-logical cooperation,and mutual knowledge transfer.The United States continues to provide Israel with significant security assi

23、stance based on a memorandum of under-standing signed by both countries in 2016,which commits the United States to provide Israel with at least$3.8 billion per year in aid.The relationship is further strengthened by deep personal connections at the government and business levels as well as through c

24、ollaboration between the two countries technology sectors.In recent years,however,the United States and Israel have differed regarding their threat perceptions and approaches to China.Whereas Israel sees China pri-marily as an economic partner and is increasing its ties with the country,the consensu

25、s view in Washington increasingly sees China as a global strategic rivalmili-tarily,economically,and technologicallyeven while the Joe Biden administration preserves space for coopera-tion with Beijing in areas of common interest.In recent years,U.S.and Israeli officials have had public and private

26、disagreements over several Chinese investments in Israeli infrastructure and technology.Although Chinese invest-ments in Israel have declined since their peak in 2018,and even though these disagreements have yet to be aired publicly by the Biden administration and the Naftali BennettYair Lapid gover

27、nment,this issue is likely to remain high on the agenda.The most critical challenges in the bilateral relationship are technology protection and collaborative innovation.Chinese investment in Israeli technology companies,including those that develop dual-use technologies,remains largely unregulated.

28、Although Israel does not export defense technology to China and has placed strin-gent regulation on the export of dual-use technologies,the line between civilian and dual use is increasingly blurred,and Tel Aviv has yet to fully adapt to this reality.Washington,for its part,has not been entirely cle

29、ar about how it expects American companies and allies to limit their roles.The United States has been slow to offer alternatives to allies such as Israel for forgoing cooperation with China and has yet to develop a collaborative technological innova-tion framework that builds on the cumulative stren

30、gths of the United States and its allies,benefits all,and helps to tip the balance in the technological competition with Beijing.To address the multidimensional challenge presented by China,the United States must enhance collaboration with its allies,including Israel,its closest partner in the Middl

31、e East.Fortunately,when the United States and Israel have had differing perspectives in the past,they have successfully engaged in deep bilateral consultations to work through these differences.These efforts have not always resulted in complete alignment,but they have significantly reduced disagreem

32、ents and allowed for greater cooperation.This paper represents the most comprehensive public analysis to date of the challenges facing U.S.-Israeli cooperation on issues related to technology and China.It proposes an approach for the United States and Israel to align their policies and bridge differ

33、ences by focusing on three central areas.First,the United States and Israel should establish a high-level working group to coordinate U.S.and Israeli policy on technology and China.This group should include a consultative structure led by the White House and the U.S.State Department with the Israeli

34、 Prime Ministers Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to address differences in how they see China.It should also include deeper systemic engagement between the U.S.and Israeli private sectors,academia,legislatures,and intelligence and law enforcement bodies.Second,the United States and Israel sho

35、uld align their regulatory regimes,especially regulations regarding investment screening from China,to ensure their high-tech industries are defended from potential exploitation.This process should include regular dialogue between U.S.officials at the Treasury Department,which serves as the chair of

36、 the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States(CFIUS);Israeli treasury offi-cials;and experts from a newly established committee responsible for investment screening in Israel.This dialogueshaped at the political level for implementa-tion by career government staffshould focus heavily on

37、the steps Israel should take to improve investment screening,including:anchoring the committee respon-sible for investment screening in legislation,building out a complementary intelligence capability,and ensuring that technology companies and investments are covered under this committee.There are a

38、lso areas where the U.S.government could do a better job of communicating its perspective to Israel,explaining both how the United States defines critical technologies and the types of reg-ulatory steps Israel would have to take for its companies to be granted certain exemptions from U.S.invest-ment

39、-screening requirements,which are available under U.S.law for companies from compliant jurisdictions.CNASDC2BFinally,the United States and Israel should deepen economic and technology cooperation as a counter-weight to and substitute for Chinese investments.This process should begin with a regular h

40、igh-level U.S.-Israel dialogue that brings together the key agencies responsible for innovation in both the U.S.and Israeli governments.The United States should also encourage greater U.S.private-sector invest-ment in the Israeli technology sector as a substitute for Chinese investment and should en

41、courage other democratic partners to do the same.The United States and Israel should leverage and increase investment in a number of existing mechanisms for U.S.-Israel technology cooperation,including the BIRD Foundation(Israel-U.S.Binational Research and Development Foundation),which provides matc

42、hmaking services between Israeli and American companies in R&D;the BARD Fund(Binational Agriculture and Research and Development Fund),which focuses on U.S.-Israel cooperation in agri-cultural research;and the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation(BSF),which promotes scientific relations between

43、 the U.S.and Israel by supporting collaborative research projects.This paper is only a first step toward addressing these challenges;more analysis from governments,think tanks,and the private sector is necessary.However,it is apparent that simultaneously aligning strategy,regulation,and economic coo

44、peration is the most effective way for the United States and Israel to deepen their cooperation on this complicated problem set.Backgroundefore an exploration of how to deepen U.S.-Israel technological cooperation and better align their China policies,a brief history of how U.S.-China competition ha

45、s affected their relationships with Israel is necessary.Understanding the context for Chinas increasing interest and investment in the Israeli economy and technology sector adds nuance to the recommenda-tions made in this paper.U.S.-China CompetitionCompetition with China has become the defining fea

46、ture of U.S.foreign policy.For decades,U.S.policy was charac-terized by the assumption that trade and interdependence would eventually guide China to becoming more polit-ically and economically open while supporting the prevailing international order.1 This has not happened.Although China has embrac

47、ed global trade and economic development,it seeks to bend the international system to fit its vision,and increasingly looks to outcompete or even displace the United States.Most Americans now view China as a strategic competitor or even an adversary.U.S.policymakers see great-power competition with

48、China as a clash of two systems,pitting Chinas model of autocracy against the American-led democratic order.This competition is more likely to take place in economic and technological spheres than in military conflict.U.S.policymakers therefore view Chinese investment and technological advances in a

49、reas such as 5G,artificial intelligence(AI),semiconductors,and quantum com-puting as highly problematic and a strategic challenge.Even more problematic is Chinas well-established track record of stealing the intellectual property of countries worldwide to bolster its own technological capabilities.C

50、hina often uses technology to increase surveillance,censorship,and disinformation at home.The Chinese Communist Party(CCP)also seeks to wield its invest-ments and technological prowess to promote a competing illiberal model of governance,aiming to impose a Chinese model on other countries.Beijing of