菲沙研究所-纪念罗纳德·科斯（英）-72正式版.ppt

《菲沙研究所-纪念罗纳德·科斯（英）-72正式版.ppt》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《菲沙研究所-纪念罗纳德·科斯（英）-72正式版.ppt（69页珍藏版）》请在淘文阁 - 分享文档赚钱的网站上搜索。

1、The EssentialRONALD COASEby L.Lynne KieslingThe EssentialRonald Coaseby L.Lynne KieslingFraser Institutewww.fraserinstitute.org2021www.fraserinstitute.org d Fraser Institute d iiiCopyright 2021 by the Fraser Institute.All rights reserved.No part of this bookmay be reproduced in any manner whatsoever

2、 without written permission except inthe case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.e author of this publication has worked independently and opinions expressed byher are,therefore,her own,and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the FraserInstitute or its supporters,di

3、rectors,or staff.is publication in no way implies thatthe Fraser Institute,its directors,or staff are in favour of,or oppose the passage of,any bill;or that they support or oppose any particular political party or candidate.Printed and bound in CanadaCover design and artworkBill C.RayISBN 978-0-8897

4、5-644-1ContentsIntroduction/112345Institutions,Property Rights,and Transaction Costs/5Why Do Firms Exist?/9Resolving Disputes:The Problem of Social Cost/19Applied Transaction Cost Economics:Spectrum Allocation/27Applied Transaction Cost Economics:Emission PermitTrading/33678Coase and the Lighthouse

5、in Economics/41Problems of Monopoly/45Conclusion/53Works Cited and Suggestions for Further Reading/55Publishing information/61Authors acknowledgments/62About the author/62Publishers acknowledgments/62Supporting the Fraser Institute/63Purpose,funding,and independence/63About the Fraser Institute/64Ed

6、itorial Advisory Board/65Introduction:Who Was Ronald Coase?Ronald Coase was one of the most influential economists of the 20th century,and one of the most unusual.His influence spans economics,law,and socialscience more broadly,and is due largely to two publications,the only two citedin the announce

7、ment of his Nobel Prize:“e Nature of the Firm”(1937)and“e Problem of Social Cost”(1960).ese two articles are among the most-cited works in economics,and despite their age continue to be cited widelytoday(Landes and Lahr-Pastor 2011).e ideas Coase developed in these twoworks led to entirely new field

8、s of inquiry in economics,law,management,and political science,and in conjunction with his article on using markets toallocate radio spectrum(Coase 1959),spawned new market design theoryand practice that helped to transform our society and enable innovation anddigitization(see,for example,Medema(199

9、8),Mnard and Shirley(2005),Hazlett(2009),and Veljanovski(2015).Coases style of theory,analysis,and persuasion was narrative,fact-driven,and much less formal than is the norm in economics.Coase spent hiscareer asking deceptively simple questions that revealed profound complexi-ties in the arrangement

10、 of economic activity.Why do firms exist?Why dontwe allocate scarce resources such as radio spectrum by using markets insteadof regulation?Can people resolve conflicts over resource use through bargain-ing and contracts,or is government regulation necessary?Is a lighthouse apublic good that requires

11、 government provision?How does a durable goodsmonopolist price its output?Ronald Harry Coase was born in Willesden,a London suburb,onDecember 29,1910.While attending the University of London,from which hegraduated with a Bachelor of Commerce degree in 1932,Coase was awardedthe Sir Ernest Cassell Tra

12、velling Scholarship.is scholarship enabled himwww.fraserinstitute.org d Fraser Institute d 12 d The Essential Ronald Coaseto travel to the United States,study at the University of Chicago from 1931 to1932 with Frank Knight and Jacob Viner,and visit several factories to learn howthey organized produc

13、tion.In particular,his visits to Ford and General Motorsfactories provided an empirical foundation for his first paper,“e Nature of theFirm”(1937).He initially taught in the UK,and then his academic career sawhim migrate to the US.After some years at the University of Virginia,he spentmost of his ca

14、reer on the law faculty at the University of Chicago(starting in1964),where he also served as an editor of the Journal of Law and Economics.He was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1991“for his discovery andclarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for theinsti

15、tutional structure and functioning of the economy.”His argument that firms are an organizational structure for economiz-ing on transaction costs,both between the firm and the market and within thefirm itself,led to a new field of research in industrial organization.More gener-ally,studying the detai

16、ls about the organization of production set Coase on apath to develop a new approach to economic analysis by focusing on institu-tions.Institutions are the formal and informal ways that people structure socialinteractions,including formal law,long-standing customs,and informal socialnorms.Coases wor

17、k has given rise to an emphasis on comparative institutionalanalysis,in other words,looking at the performance of different arrangementsin contexts from production within firms to environmental regulation.His anal-ysis also embedded counterfactual analysis in the examination of alternativeinstitutio

18、ns,comparing the effects of an institutional arrangement with whatthe outcome would have been in the next most likely institutional arrangement.In Coases view,formal economic theory was mistaken in assuming awayinstitutions in mathematical models,because the institutions that emerge andevolve in soc

19、iety have important economic origins and implications that areworthy of analysis.Coase was consistently critical of what he called a“black-board economics”approach to economic theory that focuses on optimizationmodels with defined constraints,not on the actual structures of interactionsand relations

20、hips that underlie economic activity.In many ways Coase foundthis to be empty theorizing because it overlooked precisely what is economicthe diverse ways people organize production and economic activity for mutualbenefit.As Coase stated in his Nobel address:Fraser Institute d www.fraserinstitute.org

21、The Essential Ronald Coase d 3is neglect of other aspects of the systemhas been made eas-ier by another feature of modern economic theorythe growingabstraction of the analysis,which does not seem to call for a detailedknowledge of the actual economic system or,at any rate,has man-aged to proceed wit

22、hout it.What is studied is a system which livesin the minds of economists but not on earth.I have called the result“blackboard economics.”e firm and the market appear by namebut they lack any substance.e firm in mainstream economictheory has often been described as a“black box.”And so it is.isis ver

23、y extraordinary given that most resources in a modern eco-nomic system are employed within firms,with how these resourcesare used dependent on administrative decisions and not directlyon the operation of a market.Consequently,the efficiency of theeconomic system depends to a very considerable extent

24、 on howthese organizations conduct their affairs,particularly,of course,the modern corporation.Even more surprising,given their interestin the pricing system,is the neglect of the market or more specifi-cally the institutional arrangements which govern the process ofexchange.As these institutional a

25、rrangements determine to a largeextent what is produced,what we have is a very incomplete theory.(1992:714)Coases influence is also evident in the work of his students and col-leagues,such as Harold Demsetz and Steven Cheung.ey applied andexpanded Coases original ideas,and in the process expanded Co

26、ases ownperception of the depth and breadth of the relevance of his work.Coase wrote and worked until his death on September 2,2013.Whyhave the ideas that he developed over an 80-year career stood the test of time?Hoffman and Spitzer summarize his widespread influence:We suggest that Coases work has

27、 enduring appeal to,and insightfor,social scientists in part because it addresses the most impor-tant social problem of all:solving governance and coordinationproblems when limited information,common resource issues,andwww.fraserinstitute.org d Fraser Institute4 d The Essential Ronald Coasepublic go

28、od issues produce conflicts among several people at once.Social science research for the past half century has focused onexamining various aspects of this central issue in particular settings.Any scholar who works on issues of corporate or common-poolgovernance,pollution,allocation of seats on legis

29、lative committees,regulation of systemic risk in financial markets,provision of mili-tary forces,patent thickets,creation of optimal communicationsnetworks,regulation of decreasing cost industries,or compensationof corporate officers can see his or her work stemming from severalof Coases original in

30、sights.(2011:S64)Fraser Institute d www.fraserinstitute.orgChapter 1Institutions,Property Rights,and Transaction CostsIn fact,a large part of what we think of as economic activity is designed toaccomplish what high transaction costs would otherwise prevent or to reducetransaction costs so that indiv

31、iduals can freely negotiate and we can takeadvantage of that diffused knowledge of which Hayek has told us.Coase(1992),p.716In all of his work Coase emphasized the importance of incorporating institu-tions into economic theory and empirical economic research.Institutions arethe arrangements,the“rule

32、s of the game,”that structure social interactions.ey vary from informal social norms about acceptable conduct to formal lawenshrined in precedent or legislation.Institutions structure social interactionsin the sense that they shape the incentives that individuals face as they makedecisions,decisions

33、 that can affect their own outcomes and the outcomesfor other people.One important institution for economic activity is understanding whatproperty rights are,how they are defined,and how they are enforced.Humansocieties have long developed concepts of what is“mine”and“not mine”(Wilson 2020).at conce

34、pt of having property in an item specifies what aproperty owner can do with that itemuse it,change or improve it,loan it,lease its use to someone else,let it lie unused,give it,sell it.A property rightis a right to take particular actions or make certain decisions about the useof a resource.A proper

35、ty rights framework reflects the activities that are and are notpermissible for property owners to do with their property.at frameworkwww.fraserinstitute.org d Fraser Institute d 56 d The Essential Ronald Coaseaffects their incentives to use the resource productively over time.For example,rent contr

36、ol restricts how someone uses their property,which affects theirincentives.Limiting the rent owners can charge limits their revenue and thustheir incentive to improve the property,which is why properties often fall intodisrepair under rent control.In situations where rent control legislation is very

37、onerous or burdensome,that legislation can even induce owners to stop rent-ing,thereby reducing the supply of rental housing and contradicting the poli-cymakers original intentions.In general,a property rights framework in which rights are definedclearly and transparently,and where rights can be enf

38、orced at reasonable cost,is an institution that creates incentives for the efficient use of resources andfor efficient production,consumption,investment,and innovation.Coasesinsights on property rights sparked a new literature that further developed theconcept of property rights theory and applying

39、it to a variety of situations(see,for example,Demsetz(1967),Libecap(1989),and Barzel(1989).Another important implication arising from the property rights frame-work concerns transaction costs.Coase defined transaction costs as consistingof all costs of using markets,contracts,and the price system.Al

40、len definestransaction costs as the costs of“establishing and maintaining property rights”(1999:898).Transaction costs affect the distribution of property rights acrossall types of governance structures and organizations.Coase never definedtransaction costs explicitly,relying instead on examples to

41、illustrate how theyaffect contracts,incentives,and outcomes.Much of a societys property rights framework depends on its formallegal institutions because legal definitions and enforcement of property rightsare inputs into the specifics of property rights.Some aspects of property rightsemerge out of m

42、ore customary norms and conventions that societies formaround property over time,but the bulk of Coases work focuses on legal insti-tutions,the effect of the law on economic decisions,and the role of the judicialsystem and legal precedent in defining property rights.Importantly,Coasestressed that va

43、rious forms of government regulation,including state-ownedproperty,are alternative ways of performing the coordinating tasks of propertyrights and entail their own transactions costs.Chief among these transactionscosts are the barriers that regulation often puts in the way of firms that wish toFrase

44、r Institute d www.fraserinstitute.orgThe Essential Ronald Coase d 7reorganize to operate more efficiently or to introduce new innovations.esecosts are often unseen and,more dangerously,ignored in traditional economicanalyses.Formal legal institutions and a property rights framework affect mar-ket in

45、stitutions by enabling exchange and supporting the formation of firmsthat will subsequently produce and offer their wares for sale in markets.Well-defined property rights are often essential precursors to mutually beneficialmarket exchanges,because a buyer is less likely to purchase from a seller,an

46、dan investor is less likely to put resources into perceived opportunities,to theextent that uncertainty exists about whether the seller has the right to sellor develop the item.Indeed,in the abstract,market transactions are reallyexchanges of rights over the use of items,as anyone who has bought or

47、sold ahouse or a car realizes.With respect to firms,one way to think about the management andorganization of firms is as markets for corporate control,which uses a propertyrights approach to describe what firms do.e extent to which markets canemerge,can operate,and can enable participants to create

48、value through mutu-ally beneficial exchange,depends on whether or not the formal,informal,andproperty rights institutions introduce higher transaction costs or reduce them.For example,well-functioning stock markets enable firms that wish to expandto easily obtain the necessary funds by selling addit

49、ional shares of ownership.In addition,share prices set on stock markets convey a great deal of informa-tion about how well or how poorly firms are currently being managed.Sharesof corporations that are poorly managed will be priced lower than they wouldwere these corporations better managed.is insti

50、tutional framework is a combination of legal institutions,aproperty rights framework,and market institutions,within a context of infor-mal social norms and conventions.A societys institutional framework deter-mines the transaction costs that citizens confront.ese costs,in turn,are animportant part o