观察家研究基金会-构建印度叙事与克什米尔新的军事斗争（英）-2021.7-20正式版.ppt

《观察家研究基金会-构建印度叙事与克什米尔新的军事斗争（英）-2021.7-20正式版.ppt》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《观察家研究基金会-构建印度叙事与克什米尔新的军事斗争（英）-2021.7-20正式版.ppt（20页珍藏版）》请在淘文阁 - 分享文档赚钱的网站上搜索。

1、IssueBriefISSUE NO.480JULY 2021 2021 Observer Research Foundation.All rights reserved.No part of this publication maybe reproduced,copied,archived,retained or transmitted through print,speech or electronicmedia without prior written approval from ORF.Building Indian Narrativesand Battling New Milita

2、ncyin KashmirAditya Gowdara ShivamurthyAbstractUs vs.Them narratives fuel conflicts and make them thrive.This brief examines therole of such narratives in impeding the path to peace and stability in Kashmir,especiallyin the current era of so-called new militancy that is aided by social media.This br

3、iefexplores how India should build a broad,collective identity in Kashmirone that willsupersede radicalism and a desire for secession.It outlines a history of past and currentefforts by the armed forces to enhance Indian narratives by winning hearts and mindsin the Valley,and identifies the gaps in

4、these initiatives.Attribution:Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy,“Building Indian Narratives and Battling New Militancy in Kashmir,”ORF Issue Brief No.480,July 2021,Observer Research Foundation.01Societies saddled with conflicts often reproduce the differentiation anddistancing between two broader collectiv

5、es,thus sharpening the dividebetween Us and Them,which in turn reinforces the very sameconflicts.1 In such a vicious cycle,narratives of rivalry and hostilityatake ground and upend national identity.This is true in Kashmir.The violent secessionist outbreak in 1989,b and sincethen,the governments ant

6、i-militancy and counterinsurgency operations,haveembedded strong Us vs Them narratives amongst the Kashmiris and alienatedthem from the Indian polity.c,2 These state actions have included crackdowns,arrests,killings of local militants,and heavy enforcement of laws such as thePublic Safety Act(PSA)an

7、d the Armed Forces Special Powers Act(AFSPA).3Consequently,a negative perception of India and its policies has been nurtured;there is popular perception amongst the Kashmiri people of the Indian statebeing a“coloniser”or an“occupier”.The impacts of these perceptions haveonly been exacerbated in more

8、 recent years,amidst what analysts call“newmilitancy”where the locals dominate the militant movement,and social mediafacilitates mass radicalisation and the spread of anti-India propaganda.It is inthis context that India needs to exert greater effort in shaping its narrativesto address the widesprea

9、d negative perceptions and maintain its territorialintegrity.This brief discusses the prevalence of new-age militancy in Kashmir and its rolein magnifying the differences between the broader collectives of the Kashmirpeople and the rest of the Indian population.It examines Indias attempts,including

10、its policies,to build a broader Indian identity within Kashmir vis-visnarratives,both before and in the current period of new militancy.The briefoffers recommendations to arrest radicalisation and promote narratives of abroader Indian identity within Kashmir.a Anarraveisastorywithmeaning,characters,

11、andaplotline,usedtorefamiliarisepeoplewiththeircollecveidenty(ethnic,regional,ornaonal)ortoevenmobiliseandseektheirsupportforaparcularpolicyoracon.Narravesarethusimportantinregionswidelyaffectedbyconflictandviolence.Theyareoenusedbythestatetosupplementitsaconsorpoliciesandmeetitsstrategicends.See:Je

12、lenaSubo,“Narrave,OntologicalSecurity,andForeignPolicyChange,”Foreign PolicyAnalysis12,no.4(October2016):610627,hps:/ Organizaon73,no.2(2019):32963,hps:/www.cambridge.org/core/journals/internaonal-organizaon/arcle/abs/violence-exposure-and-ethnic-idencaon-evidence-from-kashmir/CD167A6E5B4438E0A837F4

13、F41DB07F86#.b Aeryearsofseparasttendenciesandreligiousmobilisaon,severalKashmiris,supportedandarmedbyPakistan,inducedamasssecessionistuprisingagainsttheIndianstate,onthegroundsthatthecentralgovernmentdidnotrespecttheirelectoralmandateandriggedthe1987federalelecons.c Inthesenarraves,UsisregionalKashm

14、iriidenty,andThemisthenaonalIndianidenty.3Islamist and secessionist sentiments in Kashmir began with the onsetof conflict in 1989 when organisations such as the Jammu KashmirLiberation Front used Islam to mobilise Kashmiris against India.4 Asimilar but radicalised form of Islamist interpretation and

15、 mobilisationunfolded in the succeeding phases,as Hizbul Mujahideen(HM)starteddominating the insurgency and equating secessionism to Jihad.5 Although itsmentorJamaat-I-Islamihad long worked to replace the locally practisedSufi Islam with the Sunni Islamic culture of Pakistan,it was HM that invokedvi

16、olence to“Muslimise”the valley and integrate it with Pakistan.6In the mid-90s,when terrorist groups with more radical interpretations ofIslam,such as Jaish-E-Muhammad(JeM)and Lashkar-E-Taiba(LeT)startedto take over the militant movement,it backfired.7 Locals distanced themselvesfrom the militancy,fi

17、nding an unfamiliar culture that was dominated byforeign fighters.Yet,Islam remained a mobilising agent in the fight againstIndia.It was with the onset of the“new militancy”phase from 2014,8 that radicalversions of Islam and anti-India propaganda became entrenched once againin the Valley.Analysts po

18、int to an increase in access to social media from25 percent of the people in 2010 to 70 percent in 2015,which facilitatedthis mass radicalisation and spread of anti-India propaganda amongst theKashmiri youth.9,10 Access to social media not only contributed to an increasein recruitments for Pakistani

19、 organisations such as LeT,HM,and JeM,but alsocreated a new breed of militants whose primary devotion is to Islam.Thus,organisations such as Al-Qaedas Ansar Ghazwat Ul Hind and the Islamic Statemade their debut in the regions militant movement,albeit with less successthan the Pakistani organisations

20、(i.e.,LeT,HM,and JeM).11The Islamist propaganda and the anti-India content created a faade ofPakistani militant organisations supporting the Kashmiri cause.Social mediagave Kashmiris new channels for their grievances and political aspirations.12Anti-India narratives grew stronger,and mass radicalisa

21、tion and alienationheightened.In particular,social media platforms allowed militants to humanise themselvesand their ideology,while demonising India.13 An increasing number of localKashmiris turned to militancy and started supporting,interacting with,andparticipating in terrorist organisations that

22、had previously recruited only4Pakistani and other foreign militants.14 Messaging apps like WhatsApp andTelegram helped militants mobilise crowds;they also served as channels fortraining local militants and briefing them on weapons,explosive devices,andthe actual conduct of attacks.15 Between 2014 an

23、d 2020,there was a significantincrease in local militancy and stone-pelting incidents in the region(seeTable 1).Table 1:Local recruitment and stone-peltingincidents in the new-age radicalisationYear2014201520162017201820192020LocalRecruitments536688126218126167Number ofstone-peltingincidents4497302,

24、6531,4121,4581,99955Sources:Observer Research Foundation,16 The Print,17 Hindustan Times,18 Economic Times.19In 2017 the Indian armed forces launched Operation All Out to eliminatethe militant networks,their overground workers(OGW),and top militantcommanders.20 However,as the militants ranks were do

25、minated by the locals,these operations only reinforced the us vs.them line.5Meanwhile,in August 2019,the central government revoked the special statusof Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution of India.Multiple reports fromthe Concerned Citizens Groupd stated that the loss of Kashmirs special

26、statusprovoked widespread anger in the region,and heightened local perceptionsthat the people of Kashmir should not expect much from the Indian state.21An ORF report by Ayjaz Wani in early 2020 found Valley residents expressingsimilar sentiments:they were scared,skeptical,and suspicious of the India

27、nstate,which in their view was treating them as second-class citizens.22To be sure,people felt some semblance of safety too,as stone-pelting incidentsdropped significantly,by 87 percent,in 2020.23 Analysts attributed this to heavyon-ground deployment and outreach efforts by the Army first,during the

28、security lockdown after Article 370s amendment and later,when the countrywas placed in lockdown as a response to COVID-19.24,25At the same time,however,there were more than 160 local Kashmiris whojoined the militants ranks in 2020 alonethis disproves any assumptions thatradicalisation is no longer p

29、resent in the Valley.26 An uneasy peace prevails.In the era o f new militancyinKashmir,social media platformsallow militants to humanisethemselves while demonisingIndia.d TheConcernedCizensGroupisavoluntarygroupcomprisingformerministersandbureaucratsthataimstoassessthepublicmoodinKashmiranddissemina

30、tetheirfindingstotheIndianpublic.6India has attempted to reduce the alienation of Kashmiris,foster statelegitimacy,and build a narrative of the state being a“developmentagent”and“benevolent power”.A succession of central governmentshave undertaken strategies to promote cross-Line of Control trade,im

31、plement reservation in educational institutions,initiate skillenhancement and employment schemes,provide education scholarships,andintroduce education and livelihood schemes such as USTTAD,Udaan,and NaiManzil.e,27It is the Indian Army,however,that has had the primary responsibility tocounter militan

32、cy,beginning in the conflagaration in 1989.The Army adopteda strategy of Winning Hearts and Minds(WHAM)to counter the negativeperceptions of India,and also provide a quality life for the Kashmiris.f TheIndian Armys version of WHAM was launched in 1998 under the bannerof Operation Sadhbhavana(goodwil

33、l).28 The operation consisted of variousprojects and was given a budget of INR 40 million.29 This had increased to INR4000 million by 2015,and further to INR 5500 million by 2020.30,31A key beneficiary demographic of this operation are the Kashmiri youth.According to the Indian Army website,they hav

34、e so far built two residentialschools and 46 goodwill schools,g and have assisted in the modernisation ofnearly 1,900 government schools.32 In 2020,the Chief of Defence Staff declaredthat no students from these schools have either joined the insurgency orengaged in stone-pelting.33e USTTAD(Upgrading

35、theSkillsandTraininginTradionalArts/CrasforDevelopment)isaschemeaimingtopromoteartsandcrasofMinoritycommunies.TheUdaanschemeprovidesskillsandjobopportuniestoeducated,unemployedKashmiris.NaiManzilaimstoprovideeducaonalandemployabilityskillsforschooldropoutsorindividualswithnoformalschooling.f WHAMgai

36、neditsinialpopularitythroughthe1948Malayanconflict.Itreferstoapopulaonandspaalcontrolstrategy,wherethepriorityistowinthetrustandloyaltyofahosle/indierentpopulaonandlimitthemfromsupporngandshelteringtheadversariesorrivallingpares.See:ChristopherPauletal.,“Malaya,19481955,”inPathstoVictory,DetailedIns

37、urgencyCaseStudies(RANDCorporaon,2013),5163,hps:/www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.c5hhsjk.14.g ArmyGoodwillschoolsrefertoanumberofschoolsestablishedbytheIndianArmyasagoodwillgesturetopromotequalityeducaonandsocialindicesintheJammu,KashmirandLadakhregions.7Moreover,the Army conducts around 100“national

38、 integration”tours foryoung Kashmiris every year,where they are introduced to history,culture,and development opportunities across India.The Army also works to promotethe youths interest in sports,music,and arts,and to encourage them to takecentral and state civil service examinations.34,35 They als

39、o help students accessscholarships and gain admissions to institutions outside Kashmir,and some areeven allowed to interact and be trained by regimental forces.36Other initiatives have focused on meeting the basic needs of the people:providingmedical care and medicines,micro-hydro projects,electrici

40、ty,water,transparentand friendly governance,and sponsoring and funding children orphaned by theconflict.37 In 2014-15,over 127,019 people were treated in 283 medical camps.38The Army has also initiated the setting up of vocational training centres,andthe launch of literacy classes,skill development

41、programmes,and health andfinancial awareness programmes.39Operation Sadbhavana,however,has had limited success as it is beingconducted in parallel with the hard tacticsi.e.,the killing of militants,arrestsof local OGWs,and the heavy-handed use of AFSPA and PSA laws.The goodwillinitiatives are theref

42、ore viewed with skepticism and perceived as mere tactics ofoccupation.40 It is in these cases that scholars like Nabi,Ye and Chakrabartihave asserted that the Kashmiri people would prefer their own governancerather than good governance,and would prioritise political ambitions,goals,andcollective mem

43、ories over economic incentives.41,42Indeed,the Valley continued to witness mass protests in 2008,2010,and2016,even after the Sadhbavana programme had taken strides.Further,thetargeting of Sadhbavana projects during the 2010 mass protests indicates thatregardless of their purported benefits,these ini

44、tiatives were being seen asvehicles of occupation.43 Therefore,these projects had neither countered theextremist narratives nor integrated the Kashmiri nationalism within the broaderIndian identity.8As the new militancy posed a novel challenge to Indiawithincreased local recruitment and mass radical

45、isation,along withthe use of the internet and social mediathe Army launchedOperation All Out in 2017.The operation aimed to use militarymeans to eliminate the militant networks,their over-groundworkers,and top commanders in the Valley.This led to a steep increase in thenumber of local militants bein

46、g killed and arrested(see Table 2),triggeringhostility and protests from the locals.Table 2:Local militants killed,arrested,andsurrendered(2014-2020)Year2014201520162017201820192020Militants killedArrests70Surrenders110108150213257157225-24858292210213185300117Sources:Ministry of Home Affairs,44 Eco

47、nomic Times,45 South Asian Terrorism Portal.46,47In 2020,statements from Army officials indicated that they intended toreduce the intensity of Operation All Out.In October 2020,Lt Gen.B.S.Rajutold journalists,“Just because you the militants have held a gun,taken apicture,doesnt mean you have to die.

48、We get no pleasure by killing youngboys,who have picked up the arms a month ago or bit earlier.We will be doingmore work on ensuring surrender takes place.”48 The Army is encouragingsurrenders,even inviting parents of these militants to encounter sites so thatthey can convince their children to lay

49、down their arms.499This has become more vital as the number of surrenderee local militantscontinues to remain low when compared to the number of arrests and deaths(see Table 2).Learning lessons from its previous surrender and rehabilitationpolicies of 1995,2004,and 2010,the Army is focusing on the r

50、ehabilitationprocess,as well as providing surrenderees job and economic security.50Indeed,the Army has the opportunity to promote benign narratives of Indiaengaging in less violence and looking after the youth of Kashmir,who mightbe“misguided”.Along similar goals,within a week of the revocation of K