尼克松演讲英文原稿.docx

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1、Richard M. Nixon: The Great Silent MajorityGood evening, my fellow Americans.Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam.I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many

2、 Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.Tonight, therefore, I would like to answe

3、r some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration?What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battle

4、front in Vietnam?What choices do we have if we are to end the war?What are the prospects for peace?Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The trainin

5、g program for the South Vietnamese was beyond behind schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.The war was causi

6、ng deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.In view of these circumstances, there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popula

7、r and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him - and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnsons war t

8、o become Nixons war.But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in America, and in the world.Let us all understand that the qu

9、estion before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnsons war becomes Nixons war. The great question is: How can we win Americas peace?Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United Sta

10、tes become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.In response to the request of the

11、Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, Presiden

12、t Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.Now many believe that President Johnsons decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.But the question facing us today is: No

13、w that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate

14、withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Com

15、munists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the entire natio

16、n and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.For the United States this first defeat in our nations history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the worl

17、d.Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquence and clarity said,nWe want to see a stable Government there/ carrying on the a struggle to maintain its national independence

18、. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So were going to stay there/1?President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion

19、during their terms of office.For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense magnitude. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the counc

20、ils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace.

21、It would bring more war.For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on many fronts. I initiated a pu

22、rsuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other occasions, I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year. We have proposed a cease fire under

23、international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result of the election.We have not put for

24、th our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that were willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future.At the Paris peace con

25、ference Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthro

26、w the government of South Vietnam as we leave.We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations,

27、 I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly woul

28、d be closed.I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanois replies called in effec

29、t for our surrender before negotiations. Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of occasions with representatives o

30、f the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.None of these initiatives have to da

31、te produced results. In mid-July I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I?m now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis fbr 25 years. Through him I sent a letter

32、to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end.Let me read from that letter to you now:Dear Mr. President:I realize that it i

33、s difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it t

34、o an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Le

35、t history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.”I received Ho Chi Minhs reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my ini

36、tiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press.In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnams chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep

37、open some channels of communications which may still prove to be productive.But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in one sentenc

38、e: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.Well, now, who*s at fault? Its become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government. The obstacle is the other s

39、ides absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.There can now be no longer any quest

40、ion that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi fs deciding to negotiate - to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth - the bad news as well as the goo

41、d news where the lives of our young men are involved.Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan t

42、o bring peace a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the major shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine a

43、policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.We Americans are a do-it-yourself people - were an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been ca

44、rried over into our foreign policy. In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a lea

45、der of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: ?When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.?Well in accordance with this wi

46、se counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia. First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose surviva

47、l we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing t

48、he manpower for its defense.After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.The defense of freedom is everybody*s busine

49、ss not just Americas business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous Administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vie